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A Comprehensive Theory of Deal Structure: 
Understanding How Transactional Structure Creates 
Value 
Michael S. Knoll* and Daniel M. G. Raff** 
Since joining the academy, Professor Victor Fleischer has been writing 
about transactional structures.1  In Regulatory Arbitrage, Professor Fleischer 
gives his richest account to date of how lawyers think about the process by 
which transactions are structured and implementing documents are drafted.2  
Drawing on a series of interviews he conducted with partners at major law 
firms, Professor Fleischer integrates sophisticated legal practice and 
academic theory to describe the many considerations that bear on the 
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1. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal 
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (discussing situations in which the legal infrastructure 
of a deal alters the brand image of the company); Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of 
Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137 (2003) (discussing the rationality of 
venture-capital deal planners organizing start-ups as corporations); Victor Fleischer, Two and 
Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008) 
(discussing the tax treatment of the share of partnership profits that private-equity fund managers 
receive). 
2. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 227 (2010). 
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structuring of complex transactions and to illustrate how practitioners 
balance those myriad considerations. 
In Regulatory Arbitrage, Professor Fleischer also seeks to provide a 
“comprehensive theory of regulatory arbitrage.”3  Professor Fleischer defines 
regulatory arbitrage as “the manipulation of the structure of a deal to take 
advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its 
regulatory treatment.”4  The basic insight that motivates much of the analysis 
in Regulatory Arbitrage, which Professor Fleischer attributes to a seminal 
article by Professor Ronald Gilson,5 is that transactional lawyers “face a 
tension between reducing regulatory costs on the one hand and increasing 
Coasean transaction costs on the other.”6  Coasean transaction costs are 
nonregulatory costs.  They include transaction costs, agency costs, and 
information costs.7  Professor Flesicher identifies the tax-planning literature, 
where these costs are often called “frictions,” as the one area where the 
tradeoff between Coasean transaction costs and regulatory costs is explicitly 
recognized.8  In contrast with the tax-planning literature, the dominant view 
in the rest of the legal and economics literature is that deal structures are 
designed in order to minimize Coasean transaction costs.  In effect, the 
prevailing view in the literature treats regulatory costs as exogenous and 
fixed.9  That simple view, Professor Fleischer argues, is incorrect and 
misleading.  Accordingly, Professor Fleischer seeks to bring together the 
transaction-cost economics literature and the tax-planning literature in order 
to develop a framework that explains how transactions are structured.  
According to Professor Fleischer’s framework, lawyers balance Coasean 
transaction costs and regulatory costs to produce an optimal transactional 
structure.10 
In our Response, we describe an alternative framework that we have 
been using in our “Deals” class in order to understand how transactions are 
structured.  That framework, which traces its origins in the finance literature 
back more than 50 years, has been used by academics to understand how 
deals are structured.  However, the usefulness of that framework to 
practitioners and its value as a pedagogical device have been largely ignored.  
Those are oversights that we believe should be remedied. 
 
3. Id. at 229. 
4. Id. at 230. 
5. Id. at 232 (citing Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and 
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984)). 
6. Id. at 231 (referring to R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 232. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 231–32. 
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Published more than fifty years ago by Franco Modigliani and Merton 
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment remains the seminal work on capital structure.11  That article, 
which is widely considered to be the foundation of modern finance, shows 
that under certain idealized conditions, the value of a company is 
independent of its capital structure.  The central Modigliani–Miller result is 
that given certain conditions (often summarized as: efficient capital markets, 
no transactions costs, and no taxes—assumptions that might seem 
conventional to an economist, however extreme they might seem as 
descriptions of the firm’s environment), the managers of a company cannot 
change the value of that company by altering its capital structure.12  The 
publication of that article had a profound effect on academic work in finance 
and related fields. 
Academic attention ebbs and flows and often ebbs and flows again.  
After a time, academics were persuaded that the theorem was true as a matter 
of economic logic, but that the assumptions were not a good description of 
the world, and so there was interesting theoretical work to be done explaining 
why capital structure did indeed matter.13  Over the last few decades, 
academics have described a variety of ways in which capital structure can 
create (or destroy) value.  Those examples can all be systematically tied to 
the Modigliani–Miller theorem of capital-structure irrelevancy. 
The form of the Modigliani–Miller theorem is that if certain 
assumptions hold, then capital structure does not affect value.  The theorem 
can be turned on its head: if capital structure affects value, this must be 
happening through the failure of one of the assumptions.14  Accordingly, 
transactional structuring can be understood to create value through some 
combination of making markets more efficient, reducing transactions costs, 
and saving on taxes.  In effect, deal professionals create value by identifying 
situations where the Modigliani–Miller assumptions fail and by employing 
capital-structure techniques that reduce the cost from the violation of those 
assumptions.  Thus, by focusing on the assumptions, the Modigliani–Miller 
theorem can be used to understand how business transactions are 
structured.15  This is sometimes called the “reverse” Modigliani–Miller 
theorem.16 
 
11. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
12. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 11, at 268. 
13.  Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance 
Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 178 (2000). 
14. Id. at 179. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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I. Elaboration of the Modigliani–Miller Assumptions 
A. Information 
 The first Modigliani–Miller assumption is that markets are efficient.17  
That assumption implies that all investors have the same information and 
process that information in the same manner.18  In the real world, that is 
rarely the case.  There are many instances where one or the other party has 
private information.  When one party knows that a potential counterparty is 
likely to have private information, such an asymmetry can lead to the 
“lemons” problem in which the market unravels because the less-informed 
counterparty is unwilling to transact with the better-informed party for fear of 
being taken advantage.19 
Such problems are very common.  They arise whenever one party is 
selling something to a second party and the quality of what is being sold 
cannot easily be assessed.  Thus, in addition to the canonical example of used 
cars,20 the same issues arise in sales of real estate and businesses.  Less 
obviously, problems of asymmetric information arise when parties join to 
work together and agree to share the benefits.  In such circumstances, each 
party is “selling” its expertise and so might have an incentive to misrepresent 
the level of that expertise or at least to avoid joining the partnership when the 
level of expertise is underestimated, but not when it is overestimated.  This 
tendency to be willing (indeed, eager) to sell at a price that is above value 
and to refrain from selling at a price below value along with the concomitant 
reluctance of buyers to purchase whatever sellers offer is called adverse 
selection.21 
Over the years, parties have developed solutions to address the adverse-
selection problem.  Those solutions can be divided into two broad groups: 
solutions that provide the counterparty with the information that it is missing, 
and solutions that cause the party with the informational advantage to act as 
if its private information was known by the counterparty.  Examples of the 
former are readily apparent and include such practices as due diligence and 
required real-estate disclosures.22  The latter are often more subtle.  
 
17. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 11, at 266–67. 
18. Huang & Knoll, supra note 13, at 178. 
19. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970) (stating that with asymmetric information, “it is quite 
possible to have the bad [i.e., the ‘lemons’] driving out the not-so-bad driving out the medium 
driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists 
at all”). 
20. Id. at 489–92. 
21. Id. at 493. 
22. See Srikant Datar et al., Earnouts: The Effects of Adverse Selection and Agency Costs on 
Acquisition Techniques, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201, 216 (2001) (“[H]idden information problems 
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Representations and warranties with teeth—backed by penalties, the right not 
to close, and so forth—and other kinds of guarantees work in this way.23  
Conditional payments, for example, work this way.24  Another example is 
reliance upon reputation.25  When these techniques work as intended, the 
party with private information in effect reveals that information to its 
counterparty through its actions.26  Thus, for example, a seller with a 
valuable reputation to maintain will refrain from selling defective 
merchandise even though the buyer would not immediately know that the 
product was defective and even if the buyer lacked legal recourse against the 
seller. 
The production of information is often costly.27  Uninformed parties can 
be reluctant to make the investment to obtain the requisite information for the 
fear that they will not recoup their investment.28  In such circumstances, 
parties with positive private information will in effect pay counterparties to 
invest in the production of information.29  That payment can take a variety of 
forms: cash, a call option, and a breakup fee if outbid.30 
Although much transactional structuring involves eliminating 
informational advantages or compensating for the effects of such advantages, 
some structuring seeks to take advantage of informational market 
inefficiencies.  A clear example here involves accounting rules, which have 
often treated economically similar transactions in different ways.  Two 
important historical examples—the rules have since changed—involve 
 
may be resolved by Securities and Exchange Commission mandated disclosures, as well as by 
preclosing reviews (sometimes known as ‘due diligence’) . . . .”). 
23. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure 
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 463 (1981) (explaining that when adverse selection 
exists, a seller may offer a warranty). 
24. See Clive Bull, The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. ECON. 147, 
153–56 (1987) (explaining that firms and workers use conditional payments to achieve “the 
efficient trade” when asymmetric information exists between them). 
25. See id. at 148–49 (relating that in some labor markets, strong reputation effects solve 
information asymmetries between a firm and third parties to discourage agents from breaching 
noncontractual agreements). 
26. See, e.g., id. at 153–56 (indicating that a firm reveals to a worker whether it is honest, i.e., 
will make conditional payments to the worker if she expends a specified effort, by making 
conditional payments to other workers when they expend the specified effort). 
27. Thomas J. Chemmanur, The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with 
Information 
Production, 48 J. FIN. 285, 286 (1993). 
28. See id. (suggesting that “the extent of underpricing [of an initial public offering] is greater 
for firms with projects that are costlier to evaluate”). 
29. See id. at 285 (explaining that a firm seeking to do an initial public offering may underprice 
the initial offer price to induce outsiders to produce information about the firm). 
30. Yeon-Koo Che & Tracy R. Lewis, The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests, 38 RAND J. 
ECON. 648, 648–49 (2007) (indicating that many mergers include “a fixed cash payment, called a 
‘breakup fee’” or a stock option, measures which may be “socially desirable given the sunk costs 
and informational spillovers from initiating a takeover bid,” a reference to asymmetric information). 
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mergers and acquisitions and stock-based employee compensation.  Until 
about 2000, public companies that acquired another company solely for 
common stock could use the pooling method of accounting; otherwise, they 
had to use the purchase method of accounting.31  Because pooling simply 
combined the balance sheets of the purchaser and target companies whereas 
purchase accounting required the purchaser to write up the target’s assets to 
fair market value, purchase accounting generally led to higher book values 
on the balance sheet.32  Such higher values, which would typically go to both 
tangible and intangible assets, would lead to increased allowances for 
depreciation and amortization, which in turn would reduce earnings.33  
Corporate managers and investors, believing that higher earnings translated 
into higher stock prices, had a preference for pooling over purchase 
accounting.  For many years, such accounting considerations drove 
acquisition forms.  Public companies had a strong preference for using stock 
as consideration in acquisitions in order to receive pooling-accounting 
treatment.34 
The other historical example is the use of employee stock options 
(ESOs) to compensate employees.  For many years, the grant of an ESO with 
a strike price at or above the market price at the time of the grant would be 
treated for financial accounting purposes as if it had no cost to the 
company.35  That was true both at the time of the grant and at the time of 
exercise.36  In contrast, other forms of compensation, including restricted 
stock, were treated as having a cost equal to their fair market value.37  Once 
 
31. See D. Scott Freed, Stock as Consideration in Mergers and Acquisitions, in ALI-ABA’S 
PRACTICE CHECKLIST MANUAL ON ADVISING BUSINESS CLIENTS II: CHECKLISTS, FORMS, AND 
ADVICE FROM THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 61, 63 (Mark T. Carroll ed., 2000) (explaining that “a 
business acquisition will be accounted for as either a pooling of interests or as a purchase” and that 
“[t]he threshold requirement for pooling accounting treatment is that common stock must be issued 
by the acquirer for at least 90 per cent of the stock of the target”). 
32. See id. at 63 (stating that with purchase accounting, “the assets acquired and liabilities 
assumed are recorded at their prevailing fair values,” often leading to “significant amounts of 
goodwill” and with pooling accounting, “the assets and liabilities of the target are carried forward at 
pre-closing book values [and] no goodwill is created”). 
33. See id. (explaining that goodwill “must be amortized and charged against earnings over not 
more than 40 years” and “can act as an unacceptable drag on future earnings”). 
34. Id. 
35. See THOMAS S. Y. HO & SANG BIN LEE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MODELING: 
APPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE FINANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 106 (2004) (explaining that “[d]irect compensation to employees is an 
expense that directly affects the net income of the firm” but that with employee stock options, “no 
compensation expense is recognized” if the exercise price equals or is higher than the market value 
of the stock on the grant date). 
36. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., 
Summer 2003, at 49, 53. 
37. David W. Mayo, Restricted Stock Notes, 57 TAX LAW. 61, 64 (2003). 
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again, for those who believed that accounting numbers affected stock prices, 
there was a strong incentive to use ESOs.38 
Although the above two examples have been curtailed in recent years, 
there are still elements of transactional structures that are chosen at least in 
part for their accounting consequences.  For example, a public corporation 
might try to complete a sale within a particular year or quarter to manage its 
earnings, or cash might be “permanently invested abroad” so the 
corresponding U.S. tax liability would not have to be booked.39 
Although economists might dispute whether markets reacted as the 
managers and investors assumed, it was the conviction of managers and 
investors that markets would react—whether they ultimately do is 
irrelevant—that led companies to take these steps.  Either way, inefficient 
markets create two different kinds of opportunities to use transactional 
structure to create value.  First, when the less-well-informed party is 
suspicious of the other party’s informational advantage, that suspicion will 
lead to the development and employment of techniques that eliminate the 
informational advantage either directly or indirectly.  Alternatively, when the 
less-well-informed party is not suspicious, it will lead to the development 
and employment of techniques that will take advantage of that difference. 
B. Transaction Costs 
 The second Modigliani–Miller assumption is that markets are perfect.40  
That assumption means that there are no transaction, contracting, or agency 
costs.41  This assumption implies that the cash flows themselves are 
independent of transactional structures.  There are numerous examples in this 
category and they range from the obvious to the subtle.  Many acquirers 
prefer to purchase the target’s stock or effect a merger, rather than purchase 
the target’s assets, because asset sales have higher transaction costs since 
assets and liabilities have to be transferred.  Specifically, titled assets—
automobiles, aircraft, real estate—must have their new titles recorded in 
order for the transfers to be respected.  One of the reasons given for why 
public companies go private (especially since the enactment of Sarbanes-
 
38. See HO & LEE, supra note 35, at 107 (“The Wall Street Journal . . . reported that the 
estimated percentages declines in earnings per share for 2002 if stock options were expensed: 
information technology, 70 percent; telecom, 12 percent.”). 
39.  Jennifer Blouin & Linda Krull, Bringing It Home: A Study Surrounding the Repartriation 
of Foreign Earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 47 J. OF ACCOUNTING RES. 
1027, 1032 n.8 (2009); see also Richard C. Sauer, Financial Statement Fraud: The Boundaries of 
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 57 BUS. LAW. 955, 957–58 (2002) (stating that not all 
earnings management is illegal, and that the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles allow 
substantial leeway to companies for determining when to book revenue or expenses). 
40. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 11, at 266–67.  
41. Huang & Knoll, supra note 13, at 178. 
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Oxley42) is that they can avoid the expense of complying with the 
information-reporting requirements that apply to public companies.  Still 
another example is the decision to issue securities privately and avoid the 
cost of registering those securities, which would be necessary for a public 
offering.  Another example is deciding how much debt a corporation should 
have in its capital structure.  The more debt a corporation has, the greater the 
probability of bankruptcy, and hence the higher the probability of incurring 
the costs of bankruptcy.  (In the last example, the cost is an expected cost, 
not an inevitable cost.) 
It is worth noting that in many instances capital structures are chosen 
that do not minimize transaction costs.  The decision makers incur these 
additional costs because there are other benefits that offset and exceed the 
added transaction costs.  For example, a corporation might choose to issue 
debt, rather than equity, in spite of the increased probability of bankruptcy 
(and hence the higher expected bankruptcy costs) because of the signaling 
effects of debt and the tax savings that debt provides.  Such tradeoffs are a 
recurring theme in understanding transactional structures. 
A frequent and extremely important problem in situations with multiple 
parties is agency costs.  In a world with perfect markets (including 
competitive markets for jobs as agents), a principal can effectively control an 
agent at no cost, so the agent will do exactly what the principal wants.  In 
such a world, the principal will pay the agent what it is worth to the principal 
to have the agent take those actions (bearing in mind that the agent can 
choose whether or not to undertake that task for the specified remuneration).  
In the real world, there are many types of transaction costs that render 
markets imperfect and produce inconsistent incentives.  Typically, the 
remuneration is fixed, but the tasks are not.  Such incentive problems are 
ubiquitous in business because of the need for multiple actors to work 
together to perform complex tasks under conditions in which monitoring is 
costly or impossible. 
As with asymmetric information, there are both direct and indirect ways 
to attack agency problems.  Direct solutions would include writing contracts 
that prohibit the undesirable behavior.  A good example of this practice is the 
covenants in an acquisition agreement, such as the promises not to pay out 
dividends to shareholders or bonuses to executives.43  However, in many 
cases the undesirable behavior cannot be directly observed, making such 
direct approaches impractical.  Indirect solutions might involve writing 
contracts that do not ban the undesirable behavior, but instead provide 
 
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
43. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of 
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 870–71 (2010) (describing restrictive covenants on 
issuing dividends and entering into employment agreements in the 2009 acquisition agreement 
between Pfizer and Wyeth). 
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different payoffs that are linked to the behavior.44  For example, a contract 
that pays a baseball player a bonus for hitting a target number of home runs 
or slugging percentage.  In many circumstances, however, the desirable 
behavior is not directly observable, so the reward cannot be given for good 
behavior and withheld for bad behavior.  In such cases the payment must be 
linked to an imperfect proxy.  A good example of such a contract is the 
provision of stock-based compensation.45  The imperfection of the proxy 
raises a host of questions (and has produced a vast literature).46  And one of 
the biggest questions relates to the next category of issues. 
An important class of problems that arises from imperfect markets is 
given the name moral hazard.47  The term, which comes from insurance, 
refers to the diminished—and possibly eliminated—incentive for an insured 
to care for the insured property as coverage increases.48  Although the term 
moral hazard comes from insurance, it does not arise only with insurance 
contracts.49  The basic idea with moral hazard is that a decision maker who 
receives proportionately more of the upside if a risk turns out well than the 
downside if it turns out poorly might take a risk even if the expected return is 
negative.  Moral hazard can occur because of debt in capital structures; it 
occurs with carried interests; and it occurs in many other situations. 
Another class of problems that builds off of imperfect markets goes by 
the name asset specificity.50  An investment is specific to a transaction when 
the investment is worth more inside the transaction than outside.51  When a 
 
44. In practice, the line between direct and indirect solutions is often blurred.  An explicit 
prohibition is often backed with a provision that sets a price for its violation. 
45. See Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based 
Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (2007) (“The literature explains that broad-based 
employee stock option plans . . . are designed primarily to motivate employees to exert greater 
effort.”). 
46. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive 
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 301, 303 (1995) (“The real problem with the trend toward 
stock-based compensation and the assumption that it will properly reward and motivate executives 
lies in the rapid development of new financial products in the booming derivatives market.”); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1488 (2007) (explaining that 
stock-based compensation may actually motivate directors to accept “aggressive accounting rather 
than stock-price-puncturing disclosure”); Hannes, supra note 45, at 1423 (questioning the ability of 
an individual employee to affect the value of a company’s stock). 
47. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979) 
(asserting that moral hazard is the result of “an asymmetry of information among individuals that 
results because individual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon”). 
48. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963) (discussing moral hazard in the context of health insurance). 
49. Id.; see also Holmström, supra note 47, at 74 (noting that moral hazard “is common in 
insurance, labor contracting, and the delegation of decisionmaking responsibility”). 
50. Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1537, 1546 (1981). 
51. Id. 
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party makes such an investment and develops such an asset, there is a risk 
that a counterparty will subsequently behave opportunistically and try to 
expropriate some of the value the asset generates.  A famous, although 
recently contested example, is that of General Motors (GM) and Fisher Body 
company.52  Fisher produced automobile bodies for GM, and GM sought to 
have Fisher build its plants adjacent to GM’s auto plants, which would 
reduce transportation costs for sales to GM.53  Fisher was thought reluctant to 
do so because it would raise costs for sales to other car companies,54 which 
would expose Fisher to the risk of exploitation by GM.55 
As with the other types of issues, there is with agency problems the 
familiar division of responses into direct and indirect responses.  Direct 
responses constitute various long-term, enforceable contracts, which set 
(sometimes fixed, sometimes through price-adjustment formulae) prices 
between the two parties.  Indirect responses take a number of forms, 
including structuring payments to cover the cost of investment, elaborate put-
call provisions that work to protect the parties, and take-or-pay production 
contracts.  The drafting of all such provisions can be complicated because the 
provisions can create collateral incentives for other value-affecting acts. 
There is yet another class of problems that builds off of both inefficient 
and imperfect markets.  In a world with perfect and efficient markets, all 
assets and cash-flow streams have the same value to everyone.  In such a 
world, all investors hold the market portfolio.  In such a market, all investors 
place the same value on all cash-flow streams in part because they can buy or 
sell all cash-flow streams at the market price.  However, in the real world, 
with imperfect and inefficient markets, assets are not all tradable and 
infinitely divisible.  As a result, cash-flow streams do not always have the 
same value to everyone.  In such circumstances, different assets might have 
 
52. See R. H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15, 
15–16 (2000) (contending that the Fisher Body–General Motors case was not actually a case of 
holdup, as it is frequently cited to be).  For further reading on the controversy over the GM–Fisher 
Body example, compare Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel?  The GM–Fisher Body 
Contract, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1071, 1076–80 (2008) (arguing that the 1919 contract 
between GM and Fisher Body, in which the parties entered into a ten-year exclusive-dealing cost-
plus contract whereby GM would purchase automobile bodies only from Fisher, was not an 
enforceable contract because it lacked consideration) with Benjamin Klein, The Enforceability of 
the GM–Fisher Body Contract:  Comment on Goldberg, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1085, 1087–
90 (2008) (arguing that the contract was enforceable and that, even if it was not, the parties acted as 
if it was enforceable).     
53. See Benjamin Klein, Contract Costs and Administered Prices: An Economic Theory of 
Rigid Wages, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 335 (1984) (“[B]ecause transportation costs were 
reimbursable as part of the price formula, Fisher refused to locate their body plants adjacent to 
GM’s assembly plant, a move which GM claimed was necessary for production efficiency.”). 
54. Coase, supra note 52, at 29. 
55. See Klein, supra note 53, at 335 (relating that because Fisher Body had made a General-
Motors-specific investment, it would have been exceedingly vulnerable to holdup by General 
Motors unless “the General Motors-Fisher Body contract included an exclusive dealing clause”). 
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different values to different potential holders.  That can be an opportunity to 
increase value as when some investors are better able to hedge, prevent, or 
otherwise endure risk.  More frequently, however, it is a cost. 
The classic example is paying employees with stock-based 
compensation.  Stock-based compensation imposes risk on parties that are 
likely to have the least tolerance for that risk.  In contrast with the issuer’s 
employees, other stock purchasers can diversify the risk from any given 
stock by limiting their holdings of that stock and investing in other assets.  
However, for employees whose jobs are by definition connected with their 
employer, the stock compensation exacerbates existing risk.  Of course, 
stock-based compensation is employed because it aligns incentives, but at a 
cost. 
C. Taxes 
 The third Modigliani–Miller assumption is that there are no taxes.56  The 
existence of taxes in and of themselves does not mean that structure matters.  
What is needed for structure to matter is for there to be differential taxes so 
that different structures produce different tax consequences.  There needs to 
be a certain type of consistency in the tax system.  If that consistency is 
lacking, then there is an incentive to engage in tax planning.  The basic idea 
behind tax planning is simple.  Taxes are a multiparty game or negotiation 
with one party out of the room—the tax collector.  Expressed in its starkest 
fashion, the idea is that the parties should get together and minimize the cut 
to the Treasury.  There are legal limits.  In effect, it is a multistage game.  
The Treasury first writes the rules.  Then everyone else reacts to those rules.  
There are also other considerations.  The goal of the private actors is not to 
minimize taxes, but to maximize what is left after taxes, and so there are 
often tradeoffs between tax minimization and value creation.  The basic idea, 
however, is simple: to design a structure that maximizes after-tax value.  As 
with so much else, the details matter.  Tax law can be very complex, and the 
results often depend on the fine details of the law, but the basic idea is very 
simple. 
Although the Modigliani–Miller theorem is expressed in terms of taxes, 
taxes are not unique in having the sort of effect described above.  The same 
logic applies to many other laws and regulations.  When rules are not 
consistent, parties have an incentive to change their behavior in response to 
those rules.  Much of the structuring of contemporary transactions responds 
to liability laws (especially environmental laws), securities laws, and the 
dictates of Islamic finance.57 
 
 56.  Modigliani & Miller, supra note 11, at 288. 
57. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Smith, The Implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global Warming 
Debate for Business Transactions, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 512–13, 527–29 (2005) (providing an 
overview of the ways that global-warming laws and securities regulations will influence business 
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However, not all laws affect deal structures in the same way.  The above 
laws might all be thought of as public laws.  There is no single way of 
distinguishing private and public laws.  One way of viewing the distinction is 
as between laws that are intended to promote public interests that would not 
be adequately promoted in the absence of such laws.  Thus, public laws deal 
with what economists call externalities.58  The laws are intended to restrain 
the production of negative externalities and to promote positive externalities.  
Individual actors, however, are typically concerned only with private 
consequences, not with social consequences.59  Hence, when the law does not 
impose these costs consistently, private parties have an incentive to shift their 
behavior in response to these differences. 
In contrast with public law, private law is not concerned with external 
effects.  It operates in an area with little or no external effects (or where the 
effects are tenuous).60  Instead, it is intended to facilitate transactions among 
private actors.  It reduces the cost of such transactions.  (Thus, the law itself 
is a positive externality.)  Consequently, the deal-structuring consequences of 
private law are very different than the consequences of public law.  With 
private law, the analysis goes back to the prior two categories—asymmetric 
information and transaction costs. 
It is worth pointing out that many of the devices that are readily 
employed to deal with one category of issues have consequences for one or 
more other categories.  For example, paying employees using ESOs has 
informational content,61 incentive consequences,62 risk allocation effects,63 
 
transactions going forward); Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, The Effect of Joint and Several 
Liability Under Superfund on Brownfields, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 363, 366 (2007) (describing 
how liability provisions of the superfund law affect the purchase and sale of contaminated 
properties); Holly E. Robbins, Note, Soul Searching and Profit Seeking: Reconciling the Competing 
Goals of Islamic Finance, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1125, 1125–27 (2010) (addressing the difficulties of 
complying with Shari’a law in an ever-globalizing Islamic financial industry); see generally 
Michael J.T. McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and Capital Markets 
Development, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 427 (2007) (describing recent developments in Islamic finance). 
58. Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Beyond Zoning: Dynamic Land Use Planning in the Age of 
Sprawl, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 110 (2004) (stating that legislatures have used public laws to 
“avoid negative externalities and encourage positive ones”). 
59. See id. (explaining how public laws were used to promote the public good while combating 
the “cumulative decisions of unguided individual actors”). 
60. See Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 87, 88 (2007) 
(“Private laws differ from public laws in that they lack general applicability and do not apply to all 
persons.  Instead they are generally ‘designed to provide legal relief to specified persons or entities 
adversely affected by laws of general applicability.’” (citations omitted)). 
61. Christine A. Botosan & Marlene A. Plumlee, Stock Option Expense: The Sword of 
Damocles Revealed, 15 ACCT. HORIZONS 311, 312 (2001) (suggesting that “stock option expense 
has a material effect on measures of firm performance for these firms”). 
62. See Lloyd P. Blenman & Steven P. Clark, Options with Constant Underlying Elasticity in 
Strikes, 8 REV. DERIVATIVES RES. 67, 75 (2005) (“The incentive aligning effects of standard 
employee stock options are diminished when the options are either deep in-the-money or far out-of-
the-money (underwater).”). 
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and tax consequences.64  Designing an optimal compensation package, then, 
is a complex task of choosing among alternatives to find the best package.  
Deciding what is the best package involves consideration of information, 
incentive, and tax effects.  Consequently, selection of the best package 
frequently involves tradeoffs across the three silos—information costs, 
transaction costs, and regulatory costs. 
Twenty-five years ago, Ronald Gilson, in Value Creation by Business 
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, asked the questions: What is it that 
corporate lawyers do?  And why do principals hire them?65  His answer was 
that corporate lawyers create value for their clients by reducing transaction 
costs, and he provided a series of striking examples.66  In Regulatory 
Arbitrage, Professor Fleischer seeks to build on Professor Gilson’s earlier 
work by providing a more complete description of what transactional lawyers 
do.  In effect, Professor Fleischer’s central claims in Regulatory Arbitrage 
are three.  First, that Professor Gilson left out something important when he 
argued that transactional lawyers create value for their clients by reducing or 
minimizing transaction costs.67  Second, what Professor Gilson left out are 
regulatory costs, which transactional lawyers seek to balance against 
transactions costs.68  Third, balancing of transaction and regulatory costs 
constitutes a comprehensive theory of deal structuring.69  We agree with 
Professor Fleischer’s first two claims; however, we disagree with his third 
claim. 
Instead, we believe that the reverse Modigliani–Miller theorem provides 
the comprehensive theory of transactional structuring that Professor Fleischer 
is seeking.  For more than a quarter of a century, the legal literature has 
sought to assess what transactional lawyers do by compiling a 
comprehensive list of high-value-added tasks performed by business lawyers.  
The literature has proceeded by looking at what lawyers do and trying to 
distill from those observations what tasks are central.70  Such an approach 
 
63. See id. at 75–76 (“The firm’s executives are typically unable to adequately diversify away 
idiosyncratic risk and are prohibited from hedging by short-selling their own firm’s stock.”). 
64. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 
227–36 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the tax treatment of ESOs, how tax considerations impact the 
decisions to issue ESOs, what type or ESOs to issue, and when to exercise them).  See also notes 
35–36 and accompanying text. 
65. See generally Gilson, supra note 5. 
66. Id. at 243–44 (defining business lawyers as “transaction cost engineers,” which “have the 
potential to create value” in, e.g., “a typical corporate acquisition agreement, among the highest 
forms of the business lawyer’s craft”). 
67. Fleischer, supra note 2, at 232. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 233. 
70. In the last few years, a new generation of scholars, including Victor Fleischer, Claire Hill, 
Karl Okamoto, and Steven Schwarcz, has built on Gilson’s work by suggesting specific 
mechanisms whereby lawyers create value.  Fleischer, supra note 2; Claire A. Hill, A Comment on 
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produces an ad hoc list of factors with no assurance that the resulting list is 
exhaustive and not redundant.  In contrast, our approach starts with finance 
theory (particularly the Modigliani–Miller theorem of capital-structure 
irrelevancy) and draws directly from that theorem’s assumptions the factors 
that can potentially affect value.  It is because that theorem is widely 
accepted by economists as true (albeit not an accurate description of reality) 
that it provides assurances that all relevant factors have been included.  It is, 
therefore, a much better place to begin an analysis than an ad hoc list.71 
Because it provides a complete partitioning of the factors through which 
transactional structures can create value, the reverse Modigliani–Miller 
theorem provides a grounding that an analyst, a deal principal, or an agent 
(such as a lawyer or a banker) can use to evaluate an assertion that some 
transactional structure is better than an alternative structure.  That grounding 
comes in two forms.  First, an analyst or practitioner can look directly at the 
sizable finance literature on deal structures for literature analyzing a specific 
deal structure.  Second, and more to the point, an analyst or practitioner can 
use the approach directly by comparing how two or more alternative 
structures differ in terms of providing informational content, affecting 
transaction costs (including agency costs), and affecting regulatory costs. 
Finally, in our opinion, a major advantage of the reverse Modigliani–
Miller perspective is pedagogical.  Deal structuring is often learned through 
years of practice.  A framework based on the Modigliani–Miller theorem can 
be taught to students (and practitioners) directly.  They can then apply that 
structure on the job.  We find that there are advantages but also challenges in 
teaching a “Deals” course using such a framework.  That, however, is a topic 
for another day. 
 
Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29 (2001); Karl S. 
Okamoto, Teaching Transactional Lawyering, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 69 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007). 
71. It is, however, not a perfect starting point.  One pedagogical problem that we have observed 
from using the reverse Modigliani–Miller theorem is that it brings some considerations (i.e., those 
that relate to a single assumption, such as transaction costs or asymmetric information) to direct 
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